Alan Hansen was talking a bit of nonsense, as per usual, on Match of the Day 3 this week. The most interesting point, was when asked by Mark Chapman: "do you like three at the back?" (the tactical system). His answer, rather than being: "I don't like three at the back" was:
"I've never liked three at the back"
It's an interesting choice of words, because it typifies Hansen's 'fuddy-duddy' mentality. He has seemingly made his Match of the Day career by saying the same thing every week, and doesn't appear to want to learn or examine different approaches to football. It's as if he's allergic to foreign, new and downright better tactical systems than the 'good ol' fashioned, tight, no messing about 4-4-2'.
The main thing he cited to justify his dislike for the three at the back system, was that most teams play with one up front now, therefore you need two defenders: one to mark, one to cover. If you have three centre-backs marking one player, you lose out in the middle of the pitch and get overrun. This analysis is so flawed, it genuinely made me laugh.
Firstly, to think that three defenders are only defending against one player is tactical naivety at it's finest. He stands firmly by his rigid principles of his Liverpool days, that everyone is still man-to-man marking. It's not true. It is common for teams recently to play with one 'out-and-out' striker, but simply because they have two or three attacking midfielders in behind. Either in a 4-5-1/4-3-3 with two inside forwards cutting in like at Barcelona, or in a 4-2-3-1 with three attacking midfielders designed to create like at Man City and Chelsea. Either of those formations tear the 4-4-2 to shreds, simply because of their flexibility, and flexibility is the key to success in modern football.
These are the advantages of back three formations:
These are the advantages of back three formations:
1. You can incorporate three centre-backs
It's a common misconception about a 3-5-2 that it makes a team more vulnerable defensively. It's an understandable theory, because there is one less recognized defender, and what looks like a massive gap on either wing. Whilst exposure on the flanks is a limit of this system, it's not right to say that an opponent will get more crosses in; and therefore they'll score more goals. With three centre-backs, you can have one man marking the main striker, and two others picking up late runners from deep. This is where the 4-4-2 falls short, without an ultra defensive-minded midfielder (in which case the 4-4-2 would lose out in controlling the centre), because one defender marks the main striker. It leaves only one centre-back to pick runners up, forcing your fullback to move inside, thus creating space for an opposing attacking fullback on the other side.
A side-product of having three centre-backs, is that the team is much more effective in the air, because defenders are naturally built to be big, strong men. More aerially duals will be won, which is especially useful in set piece situations, where the ball is nearly always whipped in high. For defending free kicks and corners, you have three very accomplished markers handy, and attacking them, your team will provide more of an aerial threat.
2. It can be surprisingly effective for counter-attacking
On paper, you wouldn't expect counter-attacking to be a theme of a 3-5-2. You associate with counter-attacks very direct football, so players will be spread out, wingers will hug the touchline to draw men out and create space in behind. The 3-5-2 seems to be the opposite of that, because there are three central midfielders bunched together, and wide men who look as though they have the defensive responsibility of a fullback, and so can't burst forward. With that in mind, the obvious approach is to be constantly looking to utilize the extra man in midfield, play a very patient, probing game, and only pass it out wide when the wing-backs are comfortable enough to get forward.
And indeed, some teams do do that, but it's not the only way the 3-5-2 works. I've already mentioned how having three centre backs does a lot to negate the threat of opponents running from midfield, and getting into the box unmarked, because there's normally a spare defender. This means that teams playing against the 3-5-2 know that to score, they have two choices. They can either try their luck from long range, which rarely succeeds and essentially gives the 3-5-2 team the ball back when the shot is unsuccessful.
But the second option is to attempt to overload the penalty area. This is where our 3-5-2 team can counter-attack to devastating effect. As the opponents push men forward from midfield, the 3-5-2 team has plenty of spare men in midfield, who can track back. Not only does this deny the opponents any space in the box, but it also relinquishes the defensive duty of the wing-backs. Therefore, when the opponents have an unsuccessful shot, the ball can be cleared quickly to the flanks.
All of a sudden, the opposing fullbacks who were initially looking to support the attack are backpedaling, and the 3-5-2 team has four men forward available to counter: the two wingbacks, and the two forward men. The perfect example of this, was when Watford played Bournemouth on the second match of the 13/14 Championship season. Bournemouth had 66% possession and controlled a lot of the game, but with the score at 3-1, they kept pushing men forward to try and get level, and Watford scored three goals from counter attacks.
3. A numerical advantage in midfield
With three central midfielders, you always have a numbers in the middle of the park, which gives a team more tactical variability. Against a classic 4-4-2, two of your central midfielders can focus on their opponents, whilst there is a spare man available, which is a very big asset. This man can be used in a number of ways. Away from home against a top team where you'd perhaps settle for a point, you can use a defensive midfielder, someone who can break up attacks quickly and provide cover. Or a deep-lying midfielder, someone in the 'Pirlo role', who can use their knowhow to read the game, intercept passes and get the team moving.
Alternatively, if the manager wants to give his team a more adventurous look, the third man can be an attacking midfielder. This is also extremely useful against 4-4-2, because of the big gap between defence and midfield. An attacking midfielder can operate in the space, therefore he'll have time to wait for the wingbacks to break forward before spraying out wide. Or, he can run at the defence, draw a defender out and slip a through ball to one of the strikers.
It's only one spare man in midfield, but that option is key to the flexibility of the 3-5-2. For a defensive midfielder, the team can convert to a 3-1-4-2, or for an attacking one, it can change to a 3-4-1-2 depending on how deep the other two midfielders chose to sit, and how far the wingbacks push forward. If a manager has both a defensive and attacking midfielder in the squad, it means the tactic can be altered with regard to different circumstances. Whereas with just a 4-4-2, there's no room for maneuver, because both central midfielders are forced to stay in their area. If they push too far forward to support the attack, the team gets overrun in midfield, if they sit too far back, the team loses a grip on the game. With three midfielders, there is a lot more choice.
4. Pressure on the ball
A variation of 3-5-2 which is likely to become popular in the next few years, is the 3-4-1-2. It's the three at the back ideologists' answer to the 4-2-3-1 formation, which has become used by a lot of the top clubs around Europe. If you have two midfielders sitting relatively deep, this makes the team very adaptable for any situation on the pitch.
For example, if the left wing-back bombs forward with the ball, the left-sided deep midfielder can move over towards the left-back position to provide cover, should the wing-back give it away. Then, the right-sided deep midfielder can move towards the left, and the right wing-back can move inside and take up a more defensive responsibility. That way, the only circumstances in which the gaps in the team can be exploited should the left wing-back lose it, is if the opponent who tackled him switches a perfect crossfield ball to a winger on the opposite side. It takes a certain level of technical ability for a player to be able to do that, and it's unlikely that any defender could pull it off. Therefore, by the time the ball gets to a more technically proficient player on the opposition's team, the 3-4-1-2 side has time to re-assume it's default setup.
The key is, with a variation of the 3-5-2 tactic, players have freedom to move towards the ball in groups. Of course this opens up spaces elsewhere, but spaces on the opposite side of the pitch which only a player with a certain technical ability, can reach with one pass. Therefore, the system is excellent for teams who want to apply pressure on the ball.
5. Conclusion
With the three at the back system, a lot more teams have succeeded than failed. Hull and Watford did very well with it last season, finishing 2nd and 3rd respectively, a large proportion of their goals originating from their wing-backs. Juventus won the Serie A for two seasons in a row and reached the quarter-finals of the Champions League, while Italy reached the 2012 European Championships final with three at the back, only to tragically change it when they played Spain. With adventurous fullbacks in Glen Johnson and Luis Enrique in their squad, Liverpool have now gambled on a wingback system, and have started the season in excellent form.
It's a recurring problem in football that with the TV money available, more and more foreign chairmen get involved, not understanding how football works. They sack managers after a few bad results, so managers are constantly fearing for their jobs, and are less likely to try out a new tactical formation which will take time for players to get used to. Three at the back is a system which players will always take time to get used to, so not many managers want to put their jobs at risk. Interestingly, the five Championship managers who have been inspired by Hull and Watford's success last season to apply three at the back for their own club, are the managers who consider their job relatively safe. Zola has the same players who used it so well at Watford last season, David Flitcroft and Chris Powell are considered legends at Barnsley and Charlton respectively, whilst in their financial situation the Birmingham board are unlikely to sack Lee Clark and pay his compensation. Mark Robins at Huddersfield perhaps being the exception to the rule.
If chairmen have patience with their manager who want to use this system, and they maintain a consistent playing staff, the formation will definitely blossom. With tactical flexibility and numerical advantages in key areas, the three at the back tactic will grow ever more popular.
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